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ABSTRACT

consumers’ acquisition and carrying costs are both similar,
and if there are few low-valuation consumers, then again an

This paper characterizes the optimal coupon strategy for a

e-coupon and a regular coupon should be issued, which

monopolistic manufacturer in the presence of Internet. The

perform

literature on coupon strategies has examined the price

functions, but in this case the face value of the e-coupon

discrimination function of regular coupons (those issued off

must be much higher than that in case (1). Despite the merits

the Internet) under the assumption of fu ll consumer

of e-coupons, we find that the issuance of e-coupons may

awareness for the product; see Gerstner and Hess (1991,

reduce the benefits of regular coupons and/or aggravate the

1995). This paper allows the manufacturer to issue both

downstream channel members’ incentive problems. Our

regular and e-coupons in a marketing environment where

results are consistent with recent empirical facts.

some potential buyers are unaware of the product. We show

Keywords:

that e-coupons perform a fundamentally different function

Advertising, Promotion

respectively

Viral

the

advertising

Marketing,

and

E-coupons,

promotion

Screening,

than regular coupons: By issuing some properly designed
e-coupons to a small number of consumers on the net, the
manufacturer may benefit greatly from free advertising

1.

INTRODUCTION

which raises the consumer awareness for the product. This
happens because the e-coupons may be forwarded to the

The emergence of Internet has drastically changed the way

associates of the early receivers under the latter’s discretion.

information is transmitted. Although advertising expenditure

We distinguish two levels of redemption costs, the costs of

has fallen in the past decade, it has been documented that

acquiring a coupon, and the costs of carrying the coupon till

online advertising has become increasingly important, and

redemp tion. We show that (1) if consumers have similar

the spending on online advertising in the United States will

carrying costs, then an e-coupon and a regular coupon

reach $22 billion by 2004, more than triple the amount in

should be issued, which perform respectively the advertising

1999; see Dreazen (1999)[2]. Among the several forms of

and promotion functions; (2) If consumers have similar

online advertising, viral messages are found to be most

acquisition costs but very different carrying costs, and if

effective; see Zimmerman (2001), White (2001) and Kelly

there

(2000).

are

many

low-valuation

consumers,

then

the

1

[16][15][7] Of particular importance are the

manufacturer should issue just one e-coupon which performs
the dual functions of advertising and promotion; (3) If

1

For example, Zimmerman (2001) finds that viral messages
are much more effective than banner ads.
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electronic coupons, which spread the viral messages by
carrying rewards for the receivers; see Hassell (1999)[6].

The literature on coupon strategies has focused on the

According to a survey conducted by NPD Online Research,

screening role of regular coupons. Gerstner and Hess (1991),

currently 23% of Internet users have used e-coupons when

for example, show that regular coupons can be used to price

making a purchase, and 87% say they plan to use online

discriminate consumers if the latter’s valuations for the

coupons in the future (Direct Marketing, 1999)[17]. A

product and redemption costs for the coupons are positively

consumer may obtain e-coupons at several well-known web

correlated; see also Narasimhan (1984)[12]. Gerstner and

sites, among which the top three are Coolsavings.com,

Hess (1995)[4] show that, by inducing only low-valuation

which was visited by 51 percent of e-coupons acquirers,

consumers to use a regular coupon, the double mark-up

followed by Valupage.com, 48 percent, and Mypoints.com,

problem that arises in a distribution channel can be

30 percent; see Liddle (2000)[9]. Alternatively, corporations

alleviated,

can send e-coupons to randomly selected consumers via

low-valuation consumers’ net valuation for the product gets

electronic mail. In Taiwan, famous restaurants like the

closer to that of the high-valuation consumers. This

Brasseries at Grand Formosa Regent Taipei and King Join

literature has assumed full consumer awareness; that is, the

send their e-coupons to consumers constantly. In most cases,

size of potential buyers is independent of the firm’s coupon

these e-coupons can be re-produced and transferred from

strategy.

because

with

the

regular

coupon

the

one consumer to another.
The point of departure of this paper is the observation that
Despite the prevalence of e-coupons, little has been known

for consumers forwarding an e-coupon to a friend is less

regarding how e-coupons may be combined with regular

costly than transferring a regular coupon to an associate.

coupons (conventional coupons) to enhance the functions

Since the cost of forwarding an e-coupon is low, the

they perform, or more generally how pull promotion

manufacturer may save some costs by issuing a coupon via

instruments may be optimally designed to raise a

the net, and he may also get (nearly) free advertising if an

manufacturer’s profits in the presence of Internet. The

e-coupon receiver can be induced to forward the e-coupon to

purpose of this paper is to characterize a manufacturer’s

his associates. The latter would be possible if consumers

optimal coupon strategy in the presence of Internet.

take their associates’ utilities into account and if the face

Specifically, we address the following issues:

value of the e-coupon is sufficiently high: the only reason

1. When should a manufacturer issue an e-coupon? When

that an e-coupon receiver wants to forward the e-coupon to

should he issue a regular coupon?
2. What functions do e-coupons and regular coupons
respectively perform?
3. How to determine the face value and expiration date of an
e-coupon?

his associates is because he expects the latter to benefit from
the e-coupon. On the other hand, the manufacturer must also
benefit from the issuance of an e-coupon. This requires that
the e-coupon perform either the function of price
discrimination, or other functions. To develop a theory of

4. Why do some e-coupons have higher redemption rates

e-coupons, we therefore assume that there are consumers

than others? Should the manufacturer prefer a high or a

unaware of the product. We then apply a game-theoretic

low redemption rate?

model to identify the occasions where the e-coupon

5. Does the use of e-coupons marginally enhance or reduce
the benefits of regular coupons?
6. Are e-coupons useful for alleviating downstream channel
members’ incentive problems, just like regular coupons?

performs only the function of awareness enhancement, and
where it also performs the function of price discrimination.
Thus the marketing environment we will be studying differs
from that of Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] in two
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ways: the presence of Internet, and the presence of

consumers sufficiently fast, nearly all consumers will

consumers who are unaware of the product.

receive the e-coupon before transactions take place. Issuing
the e-coupon is efficient because it raises the number of

A second observation that motivates the subsequent analysis

aware consumers, but it does not change the ratio of

is that, although consumers must spend considerable costs to

high-valuation

locate a regular coupon, the acquisition costs of e-coupons

consequence, the optimal regular coupon in the presence of

are generally lower. Since we are interested in the nature of

the optimal e-coupon is just the optimal regular coupon in

e-coupons as viral messages (carrying rewards), we shall

the absence of e-coupons, a result we refer to as a

focus on the e-coupons that are sent out by the manufacturer,

“separability”. The optimal e-coupon is purely advertising,

and leave those e-coupons one can download from web sites

in the sense that it provides an inexpensive instrument for

2

to

low-valuation

consumers.

As

a

out of the picture. In this case, e-coupons may be passively

the manufacturer to raise consumer awareness. In fact, all

received, but they cannot be actively acquired. A number of

feasible e-coupons fail the price discrimination function in

randomly reached consumers will end up with an e-coupon,

the current case and must be purely advertising, because as

and for these consumers the acquisition costs are zero.

far as e-coupons are concerned, any differential in

Nonetheless, these e-coupon receivers must decide whether

acquisition costs across consumers disappears.

or not to keep the e-coupon for later redemption. We
recognize that carrying a coupon till redemption can also be

Second, suppose that consumers’ redemption costs consist

costly. Thus, in our model the redemption costs in Gerstner

mainly of carrying costs. In this case, the manufacturer

and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] are explicitly divided into two

should issue just one e-coupon if (1) consumers’ carrying

parts, the acquisition costs and the carrying costs, and our

costs are very different, and (2) there are sufficiently many

main results show that the functions e-coupons may perform

low-valuation consumers. If these conditions fail, then the

crucially depend on consumers’ variations in these two

manufacturer should again issue one e-coupon and one

costs.

regular coupon. The idea is that, for the manufacturer to give
up the regular coupon, the e-coupon must also perform the

Under the assumptions that the e-coupon can be transferred

function of price discrimination. This means that only

back and forth sufficiently fast before transactions take place,

low-valuation consumers should be induced to carry and

and that a consumer unaware of the product turns himself

redeem the e-coupon. The problem with this coupon strategy

into an aware consumer upon receiving the e-coupon, this

is that an e-coupon receiver may refuse to forward the

paper generates the following results. First, if consumers’

e-coupon to his associates. This could happen if the receiver

redemption costs consist mainly of acquisition costs, and if

believes that his associates are likely to be high-valuation

the costs of issuing e-coupons and regular coupons are both

consumers, or if the face value of the e-coupon is too low to

reasonably low, then the manufacturer should first issue one

create a sufficient benefit for his associates. Condition (2)

e-coupon and then one regular coupon, and the two coupons

ensures that a receiver believes that his associates are likely

perform respectively the advertising and screening functions.

to be low-valuation consumers, and condition (1) ensures

The intuition of this result is as follows. Under the

that the face value of e-coupon can be much higher than the

assump tion that the e-coupon can be transferred between

low-valuation consumers’ redemption costs. When these
conditions fail, the e-coupon can not perform the screening

2

In fact, an alternative interpretation of our model allows us
to also cover the case where e-coupons are first acquired at
those web sites by consumers constantly surfing on the net,
and then re-produced and forwarded to the associates of
these early receivers. See footnote 12.

function. The manufacturer has to run a regular coupon
subsequently to price discriminate consumers. The face
value of the e-coupon in this case must be higher than in the
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previous case where consumers’ redemption costs for

serving all consumers, he must offer more trade promotions

coupons consist mainly of the acquisition costs. This

to the retailer, so that the retailer will be better off in the

happens because when condition (1) fails, essentially either

presence of the e-coupon.

all consumers or no consumers want to redeem the e-coupon.
To induce an e-coupon receiver to forward the e-coupon to

Our theory is consistent with recent empirical facts. For

his associates, the face value must be sufficiently high so

example, our third result implies an inverse relationship

that even the high-valuation consumers are willing to carry

between the number of e-coupons and the number of regular

the e-coupon.

coupons issued, which is consistent with the findings of
Liebeskind (2000)[10]. Our prediction that, unlike those of

Our third result is that, despite the merits of e-coupons, the

regular coupons, the redemption rates of e-coupons are

use of e-coupons may reduce the benefits of regular coupons

either very high or very low is consistent with the recent

and/or aggravate the downstream members’ incentive

experiences of Grand Formosa Regent Taipei and King Join

problems in a distribution channel, if the e-coupon may not

in Taiwan. That the manufacturer in many cases issues both

be transferred sufficiently fast before transactions take place.

e-coupons and regular coupons is consistent with the report

In this case, the gains resulting from the e-coupons must be

of Editor and Publisher.3 A variant of the model shows that

traded off against the costs. The intuition is roughly as

it may also be optimal for the manufacturer to issue an

follows. First consider a vertically integrated channel. At the

e-coupon that is never redeemed. This result is consistent

time transactions take place, due to imperfect forwarding of

with some real cases in Taiwan, mostly about soft drinks and

the e-coupon, the manufacturer is generally faced with four

instant noodles, where e-coupons were extensively sent out

classes of consumers: the highs with the e-coupon, the lows

to reach a large number of consumers, and yet the

with the e-coupon, the highs without the e-coupon, and the

redemption rates were extremely low; see also our

lows without the e-coupon. A consumer with the e-coupon

discussions in section 3.

has a higher valuation for the product than his counterpart
without the e-coupon. Thus the presence of consumers with

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In

the e-coupon discourages the manufacturer from serving the

section 2, we lay out the basic model where a vertically

lows without the e-coupon (these are the consumers with the

integrated distribution channel must choose an e-coupon and

lowest valuation for the product). This implies that the

regular coupon strategy to optimally raise consumers

manufacturer’s incentives of running a regular coupon is

awareness and optimally price discriminate consumers. In

also reduced. To see this, note that a regular coupon has

section 3, we solve the equilibrium of the model in two polar

value because only the low-valuation consumers will redeem

cases, the case where acquiring coupons is costless and the

it, but in the current case, the e-coupon receivers tend to

case where carrying coupons is costless. These polar cases

have high valuations for the product, and given that they

best demonstrate our argument that e-coupons and regular

have spent the carrying costs for the e-coupon, they do not

coupons perform essentially different functions. The general

mind carrying the regular coupon (the carrying costs are

model is solved in section 4, where we deliver our main

essentially fixed costs). Thus the presence of the e-coupon

results and give interpretations. In sections 3 and 4, we also

makes a subsequent regular coupon less effective as a price

discuss the several crucial assumptions adopted in the model,

discrimination device. A similar reasoning applies when

and consider the effects of relaxing them. Two new results

there is an independent retailer in the distribution channel.

are obtained after we allow imperfect forwarding of

The e-coupon discourages the retailer from serving the lows
without the e-coupon, and if the manufacturer insists on

3

See the article entitled, “Web coupons clip,” on page 32 of
Editor and Publisher, volume 32, 1999.
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6

e-coupons. We conclude in section 5, where we discuss

incur when forwarding the e-coupon.

Because the

possible extensions along this line of research.

consumer’s objective function is additive, his decision
regarding whether the received e-coupon should be
forwarded to his associate is independent of his own

2.

THE MODEL

valuation for the product. This greatly simplifies the
subsequent analysis. As for the regular coupons, we assume

Consider a monopolistic manufacturer who costlessly

that transferring a regular coupon to an associate is

produces and sells a product to a large number of

prohibitively costly.

4

consumers.

5

The population of consumers is normalized to

one, and a fraction π of consumers have become aware of

An important assumption that will be maintained throughout

the product, where 1≥π≥0. A consumer who is aware

this article is that an unaware consumer is transformed into

(respectively, unaware) of the product will be referred to as

an aware consumer immediately after he is reached by an

an “aware consumer” (respectively, “unaware consumer”),

e-coupon. We have in mind two arguments that support this

and an aware consumer’s reservation price for the product

assumption. First, unlike other advertising activities, the

can either be V or v, where V>v>0. Let a be the fraction of

message delivered by an e-coupon comes with a benefit for

the aware consumers with valuation V (referred to as

the receiver.

“high-valuation consumers” hereafter), where 1≥a≥0. An

attention to a message forwarded by an associate, for it

unaware consumer has no well-defined reservation price, but

represents a reliable piece of opinion. On the other hand, a

we can without loss of generality take it to be zero.

regular coupon may also deliver a message with a benefit to

7

Second, the receiver is inclined to pay
8

unaware consumers, but it incurs higher costs to do so, and
For simplicity, assume that all consumers have email

since the message is less reliable, the receiver may choose to

accounts so that an aware consumer has the same chance of

disregard it.9 More specifically, we assume that sending an

receiving an e-coupon as an unaware consumer does.

e-coupon to a fraction λ of consumers on the net incurs a

Moreover, assume that each consumer has exactly one other

cost E(λ), where E(λ)=kλ if λ≥λ0 >0 and E(λ)= kλ0 if λ<λ0 .

consumer as his associate (more generally, this could be a

On the other hand sending a regular coupon to a fraction λ

friend, a relative, a colleague, and so forth). We assume that

of consumers off the net incurs a cost T(λ)=K0 +Kλ, where

a consumer seeks to maximize the sum of his consumer

K0 >0,

K>k>0.

10

surplus and his associate’s consumer surplus. This
assumption intends to substantiate the idea that a consumer
who receives an e-coupon will forward it to his associate if
and only if the benefit his associate derives from the
e-coupon is expected to exceed the small cost d>0 he must

4

Throughout this article we assume that the distribution
channel is vertically integrated. In section 3.4 we discuss
how our main results may be affected by the presence of an
independent retailer.
5
We shall apply the law of large numbers to estimate the
fraction of consumers who ultimately own an e-coupon, if
initially only a small fraction λ of consumers are reached by
the coupon. To this end, we must assume a large number of
consumers; see equation (2.1) below. The assumption of
costless production is for simplicity, and immaterial.

6

The parameter d will subsequently be used to gauge the
relative importance of high-valuation and low-valuation
consumers.
7
Proctor and Gamble argues forcefully that successful
on-line advertising must exhibit two R’s: the richness of
presentation and sufficient reward to consumers; see Hassell
(1999).
8
Erin Kelly (2000) wrote, “Marketing messages spread like
the flu, passed by word of mouth from one friend to another
to five more, until there is a full-blown epidemic.”
9
In any case, money-saving coupons, if they can reach
consumers, are useful for raising brand awareness; see for
example Mettra (2000)[12].
10
According Credit World 87[19], web sites have the
advantage of capturing customer data. Some sites have been
using “push” technology to email specific information to
specific customers. Here, the threshold level λ0 may stand
for a group of customers of whom the manufacturer has
collected useful data (by spending the cost kλ0 ). An
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performs

the

function

of

price

discrimination,

and

In this paper, we distinguish two levels of redemption costs,

“advertising” if it helps to enhance consumer awareness for

the acquisition costs and the carrying costs. The acquisition

the product.

12

costs refer to the costs that one must incur to obtain a
coupon. For regular coupons, we assume that the acquisition

The interactions between the manufacturer and the

costs for high-valuation and low-valuation consumers are

consumers are modeled as an extensive game, which

respectively A and 0, where A>0. We shall assume that the

proceeds as follows. At first, the manufacturer posts the

acquisition costs for regular coupons are fixed costs,

product price and chooses an e-coupon strategy.

representing mainly the costs of time spent on the search of

time, the manufacturer must choose a price p, specify the

the coupons. We have in mind the situation where in case

face value η for the e-coupon, and determine the fraction λ

there

the

of consumers to be reached by the e-coupon initially, with a

manufacturer, a consumer can spend a one-time cost to

cost E(λ) spent. Then, all consumers learn the price posted

are

multiple

regular

locate all these coupons.

11

coupons

issued

by

13

At this

The acquisition costs for

by the manufacturer, and those who received an e-coupon

e-coupons are quite different. For those who received

must make two decisions: whether to carry the e-coupon till

e-coupons from the manufacturer or their associates, the

the shopping day, and whether to forward the e-coupon to

acquisition costs are zero, and for those who did not, the

their associates. We assume that all consumers will visit the

acquisition costs are infinity (meaning that e-coupons may

manufacturer’s store on the same day. A consumer who

only be passively received). On the other hand, the carrying

received an e-coupon will carry it till the shopping day if

costs refer to the costs of carrying the coupon till redemption.

and only if he will buy the product on the shoppin g day, and

These may include the storage costs and the mental costs

moreover, the carrying cost (which is a fixed cost) of the

that one may incur when he has to remind himself to bring

e-coupon is lower than the sum of the face values of the

the coupon along when he visits the manufacturer’s store.

e-coupon and of the regular coupon that he thinks the

We assume that the carrying costs are fixed costs, in the

manufacturer will issue next. Such a consumer will forward

sense that once a consumer carries an e-coupon, say, then the

the e-coupon to his associate if and only if he expects his

marginal cost of carrying an additional regular coupon is

associate to derive an utility from the e-coupon higher than

zero. The (fixed) carrying costs for high-valuation and

the cost d>0 that he must bear to forward the e-coupon. We

low-valuation consumers are respectively C and c, where

assume that an e-coupon receiver does not know how many

C>c ≥0. Following Gerstner and Hess (1995), we have

other consumers have received the e-coupon before him, nor

assumed A>0 and C>c ≥0 so that regular coupons may be

does he know if his associate has received the e-coupon

used to price discriminate consumers and alleviate an

(except for the case where he has personally forwarded the

independent dealer’s incentive problems. By abusing the

e-coupon to his associate earlier), and moreover, that he,

terminology slightly, we call a coupon “promotional” if it
12

alternative interpretation is that the manufacturer spends a
cost kλ0 to operate a web-site which offers e-coupons to
the surfers on the net, and the surfers have population λ0 .
11
This assumption is crucial, for if the acquisition costs are
variable costs, one will reach the conclusion that in the
context of Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995), for example, the
manufacturer should keep issuing new coupons until the
highs have zero consumer surplus. One way to justify the
optimality of the single-coupon strategy in Gerstner and
Hess (1991, 1995) is to assume that consumers have fixed
acquisition costs for regular coupons.

Also, the two terms price discrimination and screening
will be interchangeably used.
13
Following the above fixed acquisition and carrying costs
assumption, the manufacturer will issue at most one
e-coupon and one regular coupon. We shall also assume that
a consumer is limited to present at most one e-coupon and
one regular coupon for each purchase. This seems to be the
standard practice nowadays; to implement this policy
Domino’s asks its clients to show personal ID’s. The latter
assumption can be shown to be optimal indeed, but we
choose to post it as an assumption to simplify the subsequent
analysis.
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having one associate only, will ignore the e-coupon the

consumer awareness. However, we argue that K0 and K (the

second time he sees it. Suppose that an e-coupon can be

cost parameters) tend to be prohibitively high so that this

forwarded n times before the shopping day, where n is

will not be feasible. The main problem here is that, unlike

exogenous. Given λ, if η is such that consumers are willing

the e-coupon forwarded by one’s associate, the regular

to forward the e-coupon to their associates, then ultimately

coupon may simply be ignored because it does not come

the fraction of consumers who received the e-coupon will be

from someone the receiver trusts as an opinion leader. With

xn , where x0 =λ, x1 =2λ-λ2 , and for all n≥2,

this simplifying assumption, it follows that the manufacturer
can only make the regular coupon accessible to the aware

xn =xn-1 +(xn-1 -xn-2 )(1-xn-1 ).

(2.1)

consumers.

16

We shall assume that in so doing the

manufacturer incurs a fixed cost F≥0, and hence the
Lemma 2.1 below shows that xn will approach 1 as n tends

manufacturer’s only relevant decisions concerning the

Since this is true for any λ>0, the optimal

regular coupon are whether to spend the cost F, and to

to infinity.

14

e-coupon which induces forwarding must specify the

determine the face value ρ for the regular coupon.

minimum λ0 . As λ0 goes to zero, the expenditure kλ0 goes to
zero also, this demonstrates the idea that e-coupons can

After the manufacturer chooses his regular coupon strategy,

serve as inexpensive on-line advertising instruments, as long

consumers must decide whether or not to acquire the coupon,

as inducing forwarding is no problem.

and once they have it, whether to retain (carry) it for later
redemption. Because the carrying costs are fixed costs,

After the e-coupon receivers’ decisions,

15

the game

consumers who have carried the e-coupon necessarily will

continues with the manufacturer issuing a regular coupon.

carry the regular coupon. Finally, at the last stage of the

At this time, two things matter. First, some originally

game, consumers arrive at the manufacturer’s store on the

unaware consumers may have become aware of the product,

shopping day, and they purchase the product and redeem the

and hence the population of aware consumers may rise.

coupons.

Second, those consumers who have carried the e-coupon
essentially have higher valuations for the product. The

To begin, we make several simplifying assumptions.

manufacturer’s problem at this time is similar to that treated
in Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4], except that the

Assumption 1

price has been determined at the first stage of the game. The

Forwarding of the e-coupon is perfect; that is, n=∞.

manufacturer may find it beneficial to mail his regular
coupon to some randomly selected consumers in an effort to

Assumption 2

raise consumer awareness, which is possible in particular if

V-A-C≥ v-c.

no actions have been taken in earlier stages to enhance
Assumption 3
14

There are x0 =λ initially reached consumers, who forward
the e-coupon to λ other consumers, where with probability
(1- x0 ) a new receiver has not obtained the e-coupon before.
We rely on the law of large numbers to assert that x1 =2λ-λ2
holds approximately. Now only the new receivers (-x0 +x1 )
will forward the e-coupon, and this time with probability
(1-x1 ) a new receiver has not received the e-coupon before.
This explains equation (2.1).
15
If either η=0 or λ=0, then e-coupons are not issued, or
equivalently, the manufacturer has chosen to ignore the
presence of Internet.

In the absence of the Internet, the manufacturer prefers
issuing a regular coupon and serving all consumers to not

16

For example, the manufacturer may attach the regular
coupon to newspapers, or place the regular coupon in his
store. We are assuming that the regular coupon so issued
never catches the eyes of the unaware consumers. To raise
consumer awareness in the absence of the Internet, the
manufacturer must resort to other means like advertising.
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issuing a regular coupon. That is, min(π[a(A +C)-c],

Proof of Lemma 2.1: Following lemma 2.1, at the time the

π[(v-c )-a(V-A -C)]) ≥F.

manufacturer determines his optimal regular coupon strategy,
the population of aware consumers will be 1. From

Assumption 1 is an idealization. In subsection 3.4 we

assumption 3, the manufacturer will run a regular coupon

discuss the case where n<∞. The last inequality in

and serve all consumers after an e-coupon is issued if and

assumption 2 ensures that when both the acquisition costs

only if min(a(A+C),

and the carrying costs are present, the optimal screening

stand for the lows’ and the highs’ valuations for the product

coupon will have a face value equal to the highs’ redemption

given that the e-coupon has been issued. There are two

costs; see Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] for a proof.

possibilities: Either all consumers have the e-coupon, or

Assumption 3 is made so that our results can be compared to

only the lows have the e-coupon. In both cases, we have

[v’-a(V’-A-C)]) ≥F, where v’ and V’

those in Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4]. It says that
without the Internet, the segment of lows is important

[v’-a(V’ -A-C)]) ≥[v-a(V-A-C)]) ≥F,

(2.3)

enough so that the manufacturer would like to issue a regular
coupon and serve both the highs and the lows (i.e.

and hence our assertion follows.

Q.E.D.

π[(v-c)+a(A+C)]−F ≥ πaV), and that the cost of running the
regular coupon is low enough so that using the regular
coupon to extract the highs’ consumer surplus is a good idea

3. THE OPTIMALCOUPON STRATEGY: TWO

(i.e. π[a(A+C)-c ]≥F).

Lemma 2.1

POLAR CASES

If an e-coupon is issued by the manufacturer,

In this section we shall focus on two polar cases, the case

and is forwarded by the initial receivers, then on the

where consumers’ redemption costs differ mainly because

shopping day the population of aware consumers is one.

they have different acquisition costs, and the case where the
differences are mainly due to differences in the carrying

Proof of Lemma 2.1: We must show that xn in equation

costs. These polar cases best demonstrate our argument that

(2.1) converges to 1 when n tends to infinity. First observe

e-coupons and regular coupons perform essentially different

that the sequence { xn } is increasing and bounded above,

functions, and the intuition we obtain by inspecting these

which must have a limit. Repeatedly using (1), we have

polar cases stands valid for the general case, which we shall
analyze in section 4.

(xn -xn-1 )=(x1 -x0 )(1-x1 )(1-x2 ) … ( 1 -xn-1 ).

(2.2)
3.1. The Case of C=c=0.

Since the left -hand side of (2.2) converges to zero as n tends
to infinity, we conclude that xn-1 must converge to one.

In this subsection we assume that consumers’ redemption

Q.E.D.

costs for a coupon consist of acquisition costs only.
Although the high-valuation and low-valuation consumers

Lemma 2.2

Maintain assumptions 1-3. Suppose that an

differ in the acquisition costs for a regular coupon, as far as

e-coupon has been issued, and all the e-coupon receivers

e-coupons are concerned, they have identical redemption

forward it to their associates. Then the e-coupon enhances

costs (which are zero following the assumption C=c=0). In

the manufacturer’s incentives to subsequently run a regular

this case whenever an e-coupon is issued, all receivers will

coupon and serve all consumers.

redeem it. The message we are trying to deliver here is that,
e-coupons may be very useful for raising the overall
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consumer awareness, but unlike regular coupons, they may

receivers will redeem to λ0 consumers is optimal.

not serve the purpose of screening well. This is true

Q.E.D.

especially when consumers’ redemption costs for coupons
consist mainly on acquisition costs. This observation

Note that the left-hand side in (3.1) represents the least cost

underlies our argument that e-coupons and regular coupons

the manufacturer must incur in order to obtain free

have fundamentally different functions.

forwarding of the e-coupon. When equation (3.1) fails, the
manufacturer will simply ignore the presence of the Internet,

Lemma 3.1 Maintain assumptions 1-3. Suppose that

and his behavior is as described in Gerstner and Hess (1991,
1995)[3][4]. Equipped with the preceding lemmas, we are

kλ0 < (1-π)(v+aA).

(3.1)

ready to express:

Then the optimal e-coupon is such that η≥d and λ=λ0 . All

Proposition 3.1

consumers receive and redeem the e-coupon in equilibrium.

(1-π)(v+aA), the manufacturer’s optimal coupon strategy is

The optimal regular coupon is such that ρ=A. In equilibrium

to first issue an e-coupon (η≥d, λ=λ0 ) at a cost k λ0 and then

only low-valuation consumers acquire and redeem the

issue a regular coupon ρ=A at a cost F. The corresponding

regular coupon.

product price is p=v+A+d. The manufacturer’s equilibrium
profit

is

Maintain assumptions 1-3. If kλ0 <

v+aA-F-kλ0 .

If

kλ0

>

(1-π)(v+aA),

the

Proof of Lemma 3.1: Since consumers have identical

manufacturer’s optimal coupon strategy is simply ignoring

redemption costs for the e-coupon, the e-coupon, if issued,

the presence of the Internet, and issuing the regular coupon

must be purely advertising. The manufacturer can either

(ρ=A) at a cost F. The corresponding product price is p=v+A

ignore e-coupons, or issue an e-coupon to λ0 consumers, or

and the manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is π (v+aA)-F.

issue an e-coupon to all consumers. (The manufacturer’s
profit is linear in the population of the consumers initially

Proposition 3.1 shows a full separability between e-coupons

reached by the e-coupon, and hence we confine our attention

and regular coupons: E-coupons are first issued to raise

to the corner solutions.) Note that these alternatives affect

consumer awareness, and then regular coupons are used to

the subsequent regular coupon design only via (1) changes

price discriminate consumers. This result is consistent with

in consumers’ valuations for the product and (2) the

Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] and the findings of

determination of the population of aware consumers. Note

Kuchinskas and Susan (1999)[8]. The latter paper points out

also that the optimal regular coupon, if issued, must be

that online advertising is especially useful in increasing

independent of the population of aware consumers. Now

brand awareness.

assumptions 1-3 and the condition kλ0 < (1-π)(v+aA) ensure
that the regular coupon will be issued, and since the

3.2. The Case A=0, c=0 and d<(1-a)C.

e-coupon strategy has nothing to do with the acquisition
costs for the regular coupon, the optimal regular coupon is

In this and the next subsections, we assume that consumers

independent of the e-coupon strategy. It follows from

incur no search costs for coupons. The entire redemption

Gerstner and Hess (1991)[3] that the optimal regular coupon

costs originate from the carrying costs. Since we have

is such that ρ=A, which only the low-valuation consumers

assumed that the carrying costs are fixed costs, a rational

will redeem. Since the e-coupon strategy has no bearing on

consumer will carry either both the e-coupon and the regular

the subsequent regular coupon strategy, it follows from kλ0

coupon or neither of them. Unlike in subsection 3.1 where

< (1-π)(v+aA) again that issuing an e-coupon which all

an e-coupon can never serve the purpose of screening,
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Proposition 3.2 below shows that in the current case an

The latter problem would disappear, if an e-coupon receiver

e-coupon can assume the dual roles of advertising and

thinks that his associate is probably a low-valuation

screening, as long as λ0 is small and a condition on the

consumer, or if that is not very likely, the e-coupon has a

composition of high-valuation and low-valuation consumers

high face value. This is the meaning of the condition d<

is satisfied.

(1-a)C.

Proposition 3.2 Maintain assumptions 1-3.

3.3. The Case A=0 and d≥ (1-a)C.

1.

2.

If kλ0 <(1-π)(v+aC)+F, the manufacturer’s optimal
coupon strategy is to issue just one e-coupon

In this case the e-coupon cannot serve the dual functions of

(η=C,λ=λ0 ), which only the lows will redeem but all

free advertising and price discrimination: It is not possible to

receivers will forward to their associates. The

issue an e-coupon carried and redeemed only by the

corresponding product price is p=v+C and the

low-valuation consumers while forwarded by all receivers.

manufacturer’s profit is v+aC-kλ0 .

There are three possibilities for an e-coupon: (1) no one

If kλ0 >(1-π)(v+aC)+F, the manufacturer’s optimal

redeems and forwards it; (2) the lows will redeem it but no

coupon strategy is to ignore the Internet and to issue a

one forwards it; and (3) all consumers will redeem and

regular coupon (ρ=C). The corresponding product

forward it.

price is p=v+C. In equilibrium the manufacturer’s
profit is π(v+aC)-F.

Proposition 3.3 Maintain assumptions 1-3.
1.

If aC<k(1-λ0 ), kλ0 <(1-π)v -πaC+F, the manufacturer’s

Proof of Proposition 3.2: Consider the case where kλ0

optimal coupon strategy is to issue an e-coupon

<(1-π)(v+aC)+F. It is apparently better for the manufacturer

(η>max(d+aC+(1-a)c, C), λ=λ0 ) at a cost kλ0 that all

to issue an e-coupon that induces forwarding than one that

consumers

does not. The condition d< (1-a)C, however, says that even

corresponding

if η=C so that only low-valuation consumers may redeem

manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is v-kλ0 .

the e-coupon, an e-coupon receiver still finds it optimal to

2.

will

redeem

product

and

price

is

forward.

The

p=v+η.

The

If aC>k(1-λ0 ), k< (1-π)v+(a-π) C, the manufacturer’s

forward the e-coupon to his associate. Given n=∞, lemma

optimal coupon strategy is to issue an e-coupon

2.1 ensures that all consumers will become aware of the

(η=C, λ=1) that only the lows will redeem but no one

product by the time the manufacturer chooses his optimal

forwards. The corresponding product price is p=v+C.

regular coupon strategy. The regular coupon, if it were

The manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is v+aC-k.

issued, would have a face value ρ=C. This proves that the

3.

If kλ0 > (1-π)v-πaC+F, and k > (1-π)v+(a-π)C, the

e-coupon (η=C, λ= λ0 ) is indeed optimal, since it spares the

manufacturer’s optimal coupon strategy is to ignore

cost F of issuing another regular coupon with the same face

the Internet and to issue a regular coupon (ρ=C). The

value.

corresponding product price is p=v+C. In equilibrium

The

case

where

kλ0

>(1-π)(v+aC)+F

is

straightforward. Q.E.D.

the manufacturer’s profit is π(v+aC)-F.

Proposition 3.2 can be understood as follows. For an

The condition d≥ (1-a)C says that an e-coupon receiver

e-coupon to be promotional (to perform the function of

would not forward the coupon to his associate unless the

screening), it must allow only low-valuation consumers to

face value of the e-coupon is so high that even a

redeem, but this may run the risk of discouraging the early

high-valuation associate would like to retain and redeem that

receivers from forwarding the e-coupon to their associates.

coupon. Consequently, given the parameter d, if the
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manufacturer wishes consumers to forward the e-coupon, the

e-coupon, however, can be zero, 1-a>0, or one, depending

face value of the e-coupon in Proposition 3.3 must be a lot

on whether or not the lows have non-zero carrying costs, and

higher than that in Proposition 3.1. Proposition 3.3 points

whether it is too costly to have e-coupons play the

out that the manufacturer can issue e-coupons to all online

promotional role.

users if the issuing cost is small, 17 and as before, if k orλ0
are not small, the manufacturer will ignore the Internet and

Next, we show that there are profound effects of allowing n

issue a promotional regular coupon.

< ∞. Note that with imperfect forwarding the manufacturer
has to face four segments of consumers in general: the highs

3.4 Discussions

with the e-coupon, the lows with the e-coupon, the highs
without the e-coupon, and the lows without the e-coupon.

In this subsection, we briefly go over assumptions 1-3 and

More precisely, after the issuance of a purely advertising

discuss their relationships with the above obtained results.

e-coupon with face value η, these four groups of consumers’

First, we claim that issuing an e-coupon that nobody wants

valuations for the product are respectively V+η-C, v+η, V,

to redeem may be optimal if low-valuation consumers have

and v. Depending on whether or not v+η≥ V, the

strictly positive carrying costs (i.e. c>0). The idea is that, to

manufacturer’s subsequent decisions for the regular coupon

induce forwarding, an e-coupon must at least be retained and

and the transaction price will be different. Take case 1 for

redeemed by low-valuation consumers, but that can be

example. With the advertising e-coupon specified in

costly if the latter also have strictly positive carrying costs.

Proposition 3.1, if V≥v+d then low-valuation consumers still

This is true in particular when k is very small, for in that

have a lower valuation than high-valuation consumers, no

case

the

matter whether they have the e-coupon or not; but if instead

manufacturer can cheaply issue an e-coupon that will never

v+d> V, then the ranking will be reversed. In any case,

be forwarded. Essentially, when k is small, issuing an

proposition 3.4 documents an inverse relationship between

e-coupon that will never be forwarded is just like sending a

the number of e-coupons and the number of regular coupons

catalog. Of course the problem here is that such an e-coupon

issued under the condition n<∞, which is consistent with the

may not be very effective in creating awareness, since it

findings of Liebeskind (2000)[10].

to

raise

the

overall

consumer

awareness

delivers a message without a reward; see Hassell (1999).
Taking the above discussions and propositions 3.1-3.3

Proposition 3.4

Suppose that n<∞, but maintain

together, we have the following testable implication

assumptions 2 and 3. The issuance of e-coupons tends to

regarding the redemption rates of regular and e-coupons.

discourage the manufacturer from issuing regular coupons.

Corollary 3.1 Regular coupons tend to have more stable

Proposition 3.4 renders another testable prediction regarding

redemption rates than e-coupons.

the relationship between regular and e-coupons. To see that
proposition 3.4 is true, note that by the stated assumptions

As our theory shows, an optimal regular coupon is always

the manufacturer would issue one regular coupon and

promotional, in the sense that it induces the lows to redeem

optimally serve all consumers in the absence of Internet. In

but not the highs. The redemption rate, defined as the ratio

the presence of Internet, when π,k, and λ0 are small, the

of the number coupons redeemed to the sales volume, is

manufacturer would optimally issue an e-coupon to enlarge

always 1-a>0 in our model. The redemption rate for an

the population of aware consumers, but as we mentioned
above, this would also change the composition of consumers.
In particular, the presence of consumers with e-coupons will

17

That is, k < aC /(1-λ0 ).
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induce the manufacturer to abandon the low-valuation

enlarge the population of aware consumers, and then regular

consumers without e-coupons. This together with the

coupons can be used to price discriminate consumers and to

following fact implies that the benefits of regular coupons

alleviate

downstream
18

channel

members’

incentive

are diminished, or equivalently, the manufacturer should

problems.

However, in case n=∞ is a poor approximation

optimally use less regular coupons: Consumers with the

to the reality, e-coupons may interfere not only with the

e-coupon tend to have higher valuations for the product, and

manufacturer’s incentives of using regular coupons (as

give that the redemption costs are mainly fixed costs, these

mentioned above), but also with an independent dealer’s

people essentially have lower marginal redemption costs for

incentives of taking a targeting strategy that lowers the

the regular coupon, which makes a regular coupon less

channel profits. We record this finding as proposition 3.5.

likely to be promotional. Thus the issuance of e-coupons
reduces the manufacturer’s incentives of issuing regular

Proposition 3.5

Suppose that n<∞, but maintain

coupons, when the forwarding effect of the e-coupons is less

assumptions 2 and 3. Suppose also that, besides the

than perfect.

manufacturer, the distribution channel has another member,
an independent retailer. Suppose that both the manufacturer

Another effect of allowing n<∞ is that, when k is very small,

and the retailer are confined to use linear pricing policies so

the manufacturer may find it optimal to issue e-coupons that

that a miscoordination problem is present. The issuance of

will never be forwarded by the initial receivers. This result

e-coupons may enhance consumer awareness on the one

looks the same as in the case where low-valuation

hand, but it may aggravate the miscoordination problem on

consumers have strictly positive carrying costs, but it

the other hand.

happens for a different reason. Similar to that case, here
issuing an e-coupon to get free advertisements can be costly

For a detailed discussion of the miscoordination problem in

to the manufacturer, and the cost is that it may reduce the

a distribution channel with independent dealers, see Gerstner

benefits

the

and Hess (1995)[4]. As we mentioned earlier, the issuance of

manufacturer must balance his concerns of getting free

purely advertising e-coupons may change the composition of

advertising by issuing

an e-coupon with imperfect

consumers facing the retailer, and in fact the presence of

forwarding effect and the forfeited promotional benefits that

consumers with e-coupons encourages the retailer to

would otherwise be available from the subsequently issued

abandon the low-valuation consumers without e-coupons. It

regular coupon.

follows that with the e-coupons, the manufacturer must

of

promotional

regular

coupons.

Thus

provide more trade promotions and the retailer may enjoy a
These results show that there is an inverse relationship

higher rent in equilibrium (part of this rent, of course, stems

between the number of e-coupons and the number of regular

from

coupons issued. This inverse relationship is consistent with

consumers).

the

enlargement

of

the

population

of

aware

the findings of Liebeskind (2000), where a migration from
regular coupons to e-coupons is documented.
4. THE OPTIMAL COUPON STRATEGY: THE
Finally, it should be emphasized (although clear) that our

GENERAL CASE

results stand valid whether or not the distribution channel is
vertically integrated, as long as n=∞. To the extent that n=∞
18

is a good approximation to the reality, our results show that,
in a sense of separability, e-coupons can first be used to

Recall that in subsection 3.2, the optimal e-coupon also
performs the function of a screening regular coupon, and
hence it helps to alleviate channel members’ incentive
problems.
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Table 1: 10 feasible coupon strategies in the presence of the Internet.

Strategy Category
Category I:
Issuing neither regular coupon
nor e-coupon
Category II:
Issuing a regular coupon
Category III:
Issuing an e-coupon only

S1

S2
S3
S4
S5
S6

Category VI:
Issuing a regular coupon and
an e-coupon

S7

S8

S9

S10

Feasible Strategies
No coupon is issued.

Issuing the regular coupon that only low-valuation consumers
will redeem.
Issuing the e-coupon that no one will redeem and forward.
Issuing the e-coupon that only low-valuation consumers will
redeem but no one will forward.
Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers forward and only
low-valuation consumers will redeem.
Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers will redeem and
forward.
Issuing the e-coupon that no one will redeem and forward, and
then issuing the regular coupon that only low-valuation
consumers will redeem.
Issuing the e-coupon that only low-valuation consumers will
redeem but no one will forward, and then issuing the regular
coupon that only low- valuation consumers redeem.
Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers forward and only
low-valuation consumers will redeem, and then issuing the
regular that only low-valuation consumers will redeem.
Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers will redeem and
forward, and then issuing the regular that only low-valuation
consumers will redeem.

In section 3, we discussed two polar cases to highlight the

also in their acquisition costs for coupons, as will be shown,

different roles the e-coupon and the regular coupon may play.

the manufacturer may employ both e-coupons and regular

In this section we will extend the model to the general case

coupons to price discriminate against high-valuation

where neither acquiring nor carrying a regular coupon is

consumers. As mentioned before, in the first stage, the

costless for high valuation consumers; that is C >0 and A>0;

manufacturer posts the product price and chooses its

also, the carrying cost for e-coupons is the same as that for

e-coupon strategy, including the face value ç of the

regular coupons, which is equal to c for low-valuation

e-coupon, and the fraction ë of consumers who will be

consumers and C for high-valuation consumers. All other

reached by the e-coupon initially. Given the choice of ç and

assumptions remain the same. We shall still focus on the

ë by the manufacturer, consumers decide whether to retain it

case where n=∞. In the following, we shall first consider

for later redemption, whether to forward it to their associates.

the manufacturer’s feasible coupon strategies and then solve

In terms of strategy outcome, the manufacturer’s e-coupon

each of them to derive the associated best coupon strategy.

strategies can be classified into the following five ones: (1)

Finally, we characterize the optimal coupon strategy for the

not issuing an e-coupon; (2) issuing an e-coupon which no

manufacturer through three propositions.

one will redeem and forward; (3) issuing an e-coupon which
no one will forward while the low-valuation receivers will

4.1 The Ten Feasible Coupon Strategies

redeem; (4) issuing an e-coupon which all receivers forward
and only low-valuation receivers will redeem; (5) issuing an

When consumers differ not only in their carrying costs but

e-coupon which all receivers will forward and redeem.

The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19-21, 2001.

Chyi-Mei Chen, Shan-Yu Chou, Yu -Hsiu Chiou, and Eric Wu
Lemma 4.1 shows that in the general model where A≥0 and
Given its e-coupon s trategy chosen in the previous stage, the

C ≥c≥0, the manufacturer can price discriminate against

manufacturer decides whether to issue a regular coupon, and

high-valuation

the face value of the regular coupon. Two resulting strategies

acquisition costs and through their higher carrying cost for

are available for the manufacturer: not issuing a regular

regular coupons. In contrast, all consumers incur the same

coupon,

only

cost (assumed to be zero) when acquiring e-coupons.

low-valuation consumers will redeem. 19 Combining the five

Therefore, in terms of price discrimination, regular coupons

e-coupon strategies and two regular coupon strategies, we

can do a better job than e-coupons. In the following, we will

summarize all of the manufacturer’s strategies in table 1.

consider the role of e-coupons in the presence of the Internet

and

issuing

a

regular

coupon

that

consumers

both

through

their

higher

and explore whether and when the regular coupon will be
Before the emergence of the Internet, the manufacturer only

replaced by the e-coupon.

has two feasible coupon strategies (S1 and S2). We shall first
characterize the manufacturer’s optimal regular coupon

4.3 In the presence of the Internet

strategy in the absence of the Internet, and then proceed to
analyze the other eight strategies, which become feasible

In this section, we will analyze all feasible coupon strategies

only after the emergence of the Internet.

in the presence of the Internet. According to Lemma 4.1, the
manufacturer prefers issuing the regular coupon in the

4.2 The Optimal Coupon Strategy without the Internet

absence of the Internet; i.e., S2 is preferred to S1. Moreover,
after the emergence of the Internet, the manufacturer prefers

In the absence of the Internet, only regular coupons are

S7 to S3. It happens because in both strategies, the

feasible, and the population of aware consumers is

manufacturer issues the e-coupon that no one will redeem

predetermined as π. The manufacturer can either issue no

and thus the use of the e-coupon does not change

regular coupons or issue a regular coupon that is to be

consumers’ willingness to pay but expands the market of

redeemed by the low-valuation consumers. Assumption 3

aware consumers; Since in the absence of the Internet it pays

ensures that the manufacturer prefers issuing a regular

for the manufacturer to price discriminate consumers

coupon and serving all aware consumers to issuing no

through regular coupons (Lemma 4.1), there is no way for

regular coupon or serving the high-valuation consumers only.

the manufacturer to give up the opportunity of further price

The following lemma reports the equilibrium coupon

discrimination through a regular coupon given that the

strategy before the emergence of the Internet.

market of aware consumers has been expanded by a
e-coupon. Therefore, by eliminating S1 and S3, w e can

Lemma 4.1

Maintain assumptions 1,2 and assume

focus on the remaining seven coupon strategies in addition

min(π[a(A+C)-c], π[(v-c )-a(V-A-C)]) ≥ F. In the absence of

to S2, which were classified in table 1 into two categories

the Internet, the manufacturer will issue the regular coupon

(e-coupon only and both coupons) and will be analyzed

(ñ=A+C) that only the low-valuation consumers will redeem.

below.

The corresponding product price is p=v+A+C-c and the
manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is ð[v-c+a(A+C)] -F.

4.3.1 E-coupons only

The first strategy in this category is issuing the e-coupon that
19

It is obvious that it is not feasible in our model for the
manufacturer to issue a regular coupon redeemed only by
the high-valuation consumers. Also, it is not optimal to issue

only low-valuation consumers to redeem but no one
a regular coupon redeemed by all consumers.
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forwards (S4). As far as e-coupons are concerned,

Again, with n=∞, the optimal ë will be minimum ë 0 , and the

consumers’ acquisition costs are zero, and their redemption

proportion of aware consumers will be one. The optimal

costs are exactly the carrying cost. In this case, it is obvious

price and face value in this strategy are p=v+ç -c, ç≧max{C,

that the face value of the e-coupon should be set between the

d+aC+(1-a)c}, and the corresponding profit is

high-valuation

consumers’

and

the

low-valuation

consumers’ carrying cost, i.e., C≧ç≧c. Moreover, the face

Ð(S6)=v -c-kë 0 .

(4.3)

value of the e-coupon is such that no one will forward it, i.e.,
d＞(1–a)(ç–c). In this strategy, the manufacturer will send

Here, the manufacturer issues the e-coupon only to raise

an e-coupon to a fraction ë of consumers by email, and thus

awareness level of consumers without price discriminating

there will be ð+(1-ð)ë of all consumers who are aware of the

them.

product. Hence, the optimal ë, price and face value in this
strategy are ë=1, p=v+ç u -c, ç=ç u = min{C, c+d/(1-a)} and
the corresponding profit is

20

Ð(S4)=v -c+aç u -k.

Lemma 4.2 When the manufacturer issues the e-coupon
only, the optimal e-coupon strategy is as follows:
1.

If d≧(1-a)(C-c), k＜

(4.1)

aC
and k≦(1-ð)(v-c)+(a-ð)C,
1 − λ0

the optimal e-coupon strategy is such that ç=C, ë=1
Here, the e-coupon performs the dual roles of advertising

where no one will redeem and forward the e-coupon

and promotion.

(i.e., S4) and the resulting profit is v-c+aC-k;
2.

If d < (1-a)(C-c), the optimal e-coupon strategy is such

The second strategy is to issue only the e-coupon that the

that ç=C, ë=ë 0 where only low-valuation consumers

lows will redeem and all consumers will forward (S5).

will redeem while all consumers will forward it (i.e., S5)

Therefore, the e-coupon is designed such that C≧ç≧c and

and the resulting profit is v-c+aC-kë 0 ;

d≦(1–a)(ç–c). 21 In this case, the optimal ë will be set at ë0
to take advantage of free advertising by consumers. This

aC
, the optimal e-coupon
1 − λ0

perfect forwarding will induce all consumers become aware

strategy is such that ç≧max{C, d+aC+ (1-a)c} , ë=ë 0

of the product, i.e., the proportion of aware consumers will

where all consumers will redeem and forward the

equal one. The optimal price and face value in this strategy

e-coupon (i.e., S6) and the resulting profit is v-c-kë 0 .

3.

If d≧(1-a)(C-c) and k≧

are p=v+C-c, ç=C, and the corresponding profit is
The message sent from the above lemma is that when the
Ð(S5)=v -c+aC-kë 0 .

(4.2)

forwarding cost d is too large (i.e., d≧ (1-a)(C-c)), the
manufacturer can not induce consumers to forward the

Here, the e-coupon serves the dual functions of advertising

e-coupon without giving up the opportunity of price

and promotion.

discrimination. As a result, depending on the magnitude of
issuing cost k, the manufacturer either saves its issuing cost

The third strategy is to issue the e-coupon that all consumers

by giving up the benefits from price discrimination (i.e., S6),

will redeem and forward (S6). Hence the face value of the

or price discriminates consumers by incurring the issuing

e-coupon has to satisgy ç≧C≧c and d ≦a(ç– C)+(1–a)(ç–c).

cost k (i.e., S4). On the other hand, if the forwarding cost is
small enough, it is preferable to let consumers forward the

20

ë=1 if (1-ð)(v-c)+(a-ð)ç u -k≧0.
Combining these two conditions, we obtain C≧ç ≧
d/(1-a)+c and d≦(1–a)(C–c).

e-coupons free of charge.

21
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4.3.2 Both coupons

population of aware consumers, and regular coupons are
then used to price discriminate aware consumers.

We now consider the coupon strategies in category IV where
both coupons will be used. As far as the e-coupon is

The second strategy is to issue an e-coupon that only the

concerned, the optimal e-coupon strategy is the same as

low-valuation consumers will redeem but no one will

before. The only difference is that in addition to the

forward, and a regular coupon redeemed by only the

e-coupon, the manufacturer will issue the regular coupon

low-va luation consumers (S8). In this case, the optimal ë,

that only the low-valuation consumers will redeem.

price and face values of two coupons in this strategy are ë=1,

Therefore, we will only illustrate the analysis of strategy S7.

p=v+ç u +A-c, where çu = min{C, c+d/(1-a)}, and ñ=A, and

For all other three strategies, we will just report the

the corresponding profit is

24

associated profits.
Ð(S8)=v -c+a(A+ç u )-k-F.

(4.5)

The first strategy is to issue the e-coupon that no one
redeems and no one forwards, and a regular coupon

In this situation, the e-coupon performs the dual roles of

redeemed by only the low-valuation consumers (i.e., S7). In

advertising and promotion, and the regular coupon also

this case, it is obvious that the face value of the e-coupon is

performs the role of promotion.

smaller than the low-valuation consumers’ carrying cost
such that no one will redeem and will forward, i.e., C≧c≧ç

The third strategy is to issue an e-coupon that only the

≧ 0. Because no one carries the e-coupon for later

low-valuation consumers will redeem and all consumers will

redemption,

the

forward, and a regular coupon redeemed by only the

low-valuation consumers’ carrying costs for the regular

low-valuation consumers (S9). In this case, the optimal price

coupon are still C and c respectively. Hence the

and face values of two coupons in this strategy are

high-valuation consumers’ total redemption cost of the

p=v-c+A+C, ç=C, ñ=A, and the corresponding profit is

the

high-valuation

consumers’

and

regular coupon is A+C, and the low-valuation consumers’ is
c.22 Therefore the face value of the regular coupon has to

Ð(S9)=v -c+a(A+C)-kë 0 -F.

(4.6)

satisfy A+C≧ñ≧c. Because consumers will not forward the
e-coupon, the manufacturer still sends e-coupons to a

In this situation, the e-coupon performs the dual roles of

fraction ë of consumers by email, thus having proportion

advertising and promotion, and the regular coupon also

ð+(1-ð)ë of all consumers aware of the product. The optimal

performs the function of promotion.

ë, price and face values of two coupons in this strategy are
ë=1, p=v-c+A+C, ç=0, ñ=A+C, and the corresponding profit
is

23

The fourth strategy is to issue an e-coupon that all
consumers will redeem and forward, and a regular coupon
redeemed by only the low-valuation consumers (S10). In

Ð(S7)=v -c+a(A+C)-k-F.

(4.4)

this case, the optimal price and face values of two coupons
are p=v-c+ç+A, ç≧max{C, d+aC+(1-a)c}, ñ=A, and the

This strategy shows distinct functions served by e-coupons

corresponding profit is

and regular coupons: E-coupons are issued to enlarge the
Ð(S10)=v -c+aA-kë 0 -F.

(4.7)

22

Remember that the acquisition cost of e-coupons is zero,
the low-valuation consumers’ acquisition cost of the regular
coupon also is zero and the high-valuation consumers’ is A.

23
24

Note that the optimal ë=1 if (1-ð)(v-c+a(A+C))≧k.
Note that the optimal ë=1 if (1-ð)(v-c+aA)+(a -ð)ç u ≧k.
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this strategy, the use of e-coupon is only serving the function
This strategy also shows that e-coupons and regular coupons

of advertising. All consumers receive the message but no

play completely distinct role: the E-coupon is issued to

one

enlarge the population of aware consumers, and the regular

consumers only by the regular coupon with a large face

coupon is then used to price discriminate aware consumers.

value.

Lemma 4.3 If the manufacturer issues both coupons, as far

4.4 The Equilibrium Coupon Strategy in the Presence of

as the latter three strategies (S8, S9, S10) are concerned, the

the Internet

redeems.

The

manufacturer

price

discriminates

optimal regular coupon strategy is such that ñ=A where only
the low-valuation consumers will redeem, and the optimal

In the above three lemmas, we describe the coupon

e-coupon strategy is the same as described in lemma 4.2.

strategies for all feasible ones in the presence of the Internet.

The resulting profits are summarized as follows:

In the following, we will derive the corresponding

1.

2.

3.

If

d ≧ (1-a)(C-c),

k ＜

aC
1 − λ0

and

k ≦

conditions under which each strategy is indeed the
equilibrium coupon strategy for the manufacturer. We shall

(1-ð)(v-c+aA)+(a-ð)C, the optimal coupon strategy is

summarize the results in the following three propositions.

S7 and S8, and the resulting profit is v-c+a(A+C)-k-F;

Proposition 1 is the equilibrium which the manufacturer only

If d < (1-a)(C-c), the optimal coupon strategy is S9

issues the regular coupon. Proposition 2 is the equilibrium

and the resulting profit is v-c+a(A+C)-kë 0 -F;

which the manufacturer only issues the e-coupon; i.e., after

If d ≧ (1-a)(C-c) and k ≧

aC
, the optimal
1 − λ0

the emergence of the Internet, the regular coupon is
completely replaced by the e-coupon. Proposition 4 is the

e-coupon strategy S10 and the resulting profit is

equilibrium

which the manufacturer issues both the

v-c+aA-kë 0 -F

e-coupon and the regular coupon, thus the e-coupons
complement the use of regular coupons.

Lemma 4.3 shows that, when e-coupon has been used, the
regular coupon can still be used by the latter three strategies

Proposition 4.1 In the presence of the Internet, the optimal

(S8-S10) to further price discriminate consumers through

coupon strategy for the manufacturer is to issue the regular

consumers’ variations in acquis ition cost for regular coupons.

coupon where only the low-valuation consumers will

Whether it pays to do so depends on the issuing cost F

redeem if one of the following sets of conditions holds:

relative to the benefits of price discrimination.

1.

Besides, we find that the profits of S7 and S8 are the same.
It is because both strategies involve issuing two coupons,

d < (1-a)(C-c), aA≧F, ð≧
or

2.

d < (1-a)(C-c), aA＜F, ð≧

thus having the same issuing costs. Because both total face
values are the same A+C, and only low-valuation consumers
will redeem coupons, so their revenues are the same, too.

v − c + aC − kλ0 − F
;
v − c + a( A + C)

or
3.

Therefore, if d is large (d≧(1-a)(C-c)) and k is small (k＜

d≧(1-a)(C-c), aA≧F,
ð ≧max{

aC
), the manufacturer can first issue an e-coupon which
1 − λ0
no one will redeem and forward, and then issue the regular

v − c + a ( A + C ) − kλ0
;
v − c + a (A + C )

v − c + a ( A + C ) − k v − c + aA − kλ0
,
}
v − c + a( A + C )
v − c + a( A + C)

; or
4.

d≧(1-a)(C-c), aA＜F, ð≧max{,

coupon (i.e., S8), which results in the same profits as S7. In
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v − c + aC − k + F
};
v − c + a( A + C )

the e-coupon only that all consumers will redeem and
forward. The corresponding equilibriu m price, ç, and

The corresponding equilibrium price, ñ, and profit are

profit

are

respectively

p=v+ç-c,

respectively p=v, ñ=A+C, Ð(S2)=ð[v-c+a(A+C)]-F.

d+aC+(1-a)c}, Ð(S6)=v-c-kë 0 .

ç ≧ max{C,

Proposition 4.1 says that the higher ð is , the more likely that

In contrast with proposition 4.1, proposition 4.2 shows that

it is optimal for the manufacturer to issue the regular coupon

the e-coupon only strategy is optimal only when ð is small

only. The intuition is that if ð is large, the marginal benefit

enough. Moreover, e-coupon strategy is optimal only when

of increasing aware consumers by using e-coupons is limited.

aA ＜F. It happens because when the manufacturer uses

On the other hand, the cost of using e-coupons weakly

e-coupons to make all consumers aware of its product, it

increases with the forwarding cost d. Consequently, if the

does not pay for the manufacturer to price discriminate

forwarding cost d is high, it will be difficult for the

consumers by incurring the cost of issuing the regular

manufacturer to induce forwarding, thus increasing the

coupon if aA＜F.

minimum ð for this e-coupon strategy to be optimal.
Conversely, if d is small, it is easier to induce consumers to

When d is small (d < (1-a)(C-c)), the manufacturer will issue

forward the e-coupon and do free advertising for the

the e-coupon that not only allows the manufacturer to price

manufacturer, thus making the e-coupon strategy more

discriminate consumers, but also induces all consumers to

attractive and increasing the required ð.

forward, thus doing free advertising for the manufacturer. As
mentioned before, when d is too large, the manufacturer

Proposition 4.2 In the presence of the Internet, it is optimal

faces the trade-off between price discrimination and free

for the manufacturer to issue the e-coupon only when one of

advertising by consumers through forwarding e-coupons.

the following sets of conditions holds.

When the issuing cost k is large, then the manufacturer will

1.

If d≧(1-a)(C-c), aA＜F, k＜

aC
, and
1 − λ0

prefer saving the issuing cost by giving up the opportunity of
price discrimination. Finally, the lower the forwarding cost,

k≤ (1-ð)(v-c)+(a-ð)C, the optimal coupon strategy is to

the higher awareness level is required for this e-coupon only

issue the e-coupon that only low-valuation consumers

strategy to be optimal.

will redeem but no one will forward. The corresponding

2.

equilibrium price, ç, and profit are respectively

Proposition 4.3 It is optimal for the manufacturer to issue

p=v+C-c, ç=C, Ð(S4)=v -c+aC-k.

both coupons when one of the follo wing conditions holds.

If d < (1-a)(C-c), aA＜F, and

v − c + aC − kλ0 − F
, the optimal coupon
v − c + a( A + C)

ð＜

3.

1.

If d≧(1-a)(C-c), aA≧F,

aC
≧k, and
1 − λ0

k≦(1-ð)(v-c+aA)+(a-ð)C, the optimal coupon strategies

strategy is to issue the e-coupon that only low-valuation

are S7 or S8. Both of these two optimal price and profits

consumers will redeem and all consumers will forward.

are the same, p=v+A+C-c, Ð(S7,S8)=v-c + a(A+C)-k-F.

The corresponding equilibrium price, ç, and profit are

The face values for S7 are ç=0, ñ=A+C, while those for

respectively p=v+C-c, ç=C, Ð(S5)=v-c+aC-kë 0 .

S8 are ç =C, ñ=A.

If d≧(1-a)(C-c), aA＜F, k≧

ð＜

aC
, and
1 − λ0

v − c − kλ0 − F
, the optimal strategy is to issue
v − c + a( A + C)

2.

If d < (1-a)(C-c), aA≧F, and
ð＜

v − c + a ( A + C ) − kλ0
, the optimal coupon
v − c + a (A + C )

strategy is first to issue the e-coupon that only the

The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19-21, 2001.

Chyi-Mei Chen, Shan-Yu Chou, Yu -Hsiu Chiou, and Eric Wu
low-valuation consumers will redeem and all consumers

general model the regular coupon can be employed as a

will forward, and then to issue a regular coupon that

screening device both through consumers’ variations in the

only the low-valuation consumers will redeem (S9). The

carrying cost and through those in the acquis ition cost for

corresponding equilibrium price, face values, and profit

coupons. However, the role that the regular coupon plays is

are

still limited to price discrimination while the e-coupon may

respectively

p=v+A+C-c,

ç =C,

ñ=A,

Ð(S9)=v-c+a(A+C)-kë 0 -F.
3.

If d≧(1-a)(C-c), aA≧F, k≧

ð＜

serve both advertising and promotion purposes, depending

aC
, and
1 − λ0

on the structures of consumers’ redemption costs and the
forwarding costs. If consumers’ redemption costs of

v − c + aA − kλ0
, the optimal strategy is first to
v − c + a( A + C)

e-coupons are the same, then the e-coupons can not be used
to screen consumers. If consumers’ redemption costs of

issue an e-coupon which all consumers will redeem and

e-coupons are different, but the forwarding cost is high, it

forward, and then issue a regular coupon which only

may happen that the manufacturer will optimal issue a

low-valuation

higher face value of e-coupon to encourage all consumers to

consumers

redeem

(S10).

The

corresponding equilibrium price, face values, and profit

forward and redeem it at the expense of the benefit of

are respectively p=v+A+ç-c, ç ≧max{C, d+aC+(1-a)c},

screening. In contrast, if consumers’ redemption costs of

ñ=A, Ð(S10)= v-c+aA-kë 0 -F.

e-coupons are different and the forwarding cost is small, the
e-coupon will serve to play the promotion role as well.

In contrast with proposition 4.2, proposition 4.3 shows that
the regular coupon will be used in addition to the e-coupon

Next, we find whether to issue only the regular coupon

only when aA > F. That is, this strategy is optimal only when

depends on the initial awareness level and the magnitude of

the benefit of price discrimination is large enough to justify

the forwarding cost. When ð is large, the benefit of

the issuing cost F.

increasing potential consumers through e-coupons is limited,
and therefore it is more likely that the manufacturer prefers

If d is high, ð, k and F are small, the manufacturer will first

only issuing the regular coupon to issuing e-coupons only

issue the e-coupon that no one forwards and no one redeems,

and to issuing both coupons. Furthermore, if the forwarding

and then issue a regular coupon to screen aware consumers.

cost d is high, it will be difficult to induce forwarding, and

This strategy is similar to the case C=c=0 in section 3 where

thus

price discrimination through e-coupons is not possible.

regular-coupon-only strategy to be optimal will be smaller.

the

required

awareness

level

ð

for

the

However, when C > 0, the strategy S7 will not be dominated
by the strategy S10 any more. The reason is that unlike the

Third, we find that whether the manufacturer will issue the

latter strategy, the former strategy reserves the opportunity

e-coupon that will be forwarded by consumers depends on

of price discriminating consumers through their variations in

the issuing cost k and d. When d is small, the manufacturer

carrying cost for coupons, thus obtaining an extra benefit aC.

will issue the e-coupon that will be forwarded by all

In this strategy, the e-coupon and the regular coupon

consumers, thus enjoying the benefit of free advertising.

perform

When d is large, if k is small, the manufacturer prefers to

respectively

the

advertising

and

promotion

functions.

issue e-coupons to all consumers directly. If k is large,
inducing forwarding is optimal for the manufacturer.

4.5 Discussions
Finally, we find that when ð is not large enough but F is
From the above three propositions, we find that in this

higher, the regular coupon will be replaced by the e-coupon.
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However, when ð is not large enough and F is smaller, the

among

consumers.

Consumers

are

mainly

classified

manufacturer will issue two coupons. Thus the e-coupon

according to their valuations for the product, and depending

will be used to complement the regular coupon.

on the classification, they are attached with different
redemption costs. In particular, we have assumed that all
consumers are equal in the ability of using email. It would

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

be much more realistic to allow the presence of consumers
who have no access to e-coupons, and hence even perfect

In this paper we have conducted an exploratory study of the

forwarding will not result in the same composition of

functions of e-coupons and their interactions with regular

consumers for the manufacturer as without the Internet.

coupons, and we have provided a characterization of the
optimal combination of the two coupons for a monopolistic

Despite the above limitations, the paper has obtained useful

manufacturer. Our results, as mentioned in section 1, are

insights for marketing researchers and professionals. The

found consistent with several recently documented empirical

obtained propositions contain testable implications, in

facts.

particular those statements about the face values and
redemption rates of the regular and e-coupons.

The current study is admittedly imperfect. However, its
major limitations can be lifted in further research along this
line. First, for our purpose the current paper has focused on

APPENDIX

polar cases where either the acquisition costs or the carrying
costs are absent. This can be easily improved upon, by

Before the emergence of the Internet, the manufacturer must

allowing general redemption costs. Similarly, as we

also decide whether to serve all consumers or the

mentioned in section 3.4, allowing non-zero redemption

high-valuation consumers only, and his optimal profit in this

costs

case is equal to

for

low-valuation

consumers

has

important

implications for the manufacturer’s coupon strategy, and its
implications can be easily obtained.

Ð(S1)= max{ðv, ðaV}.

(A.1)

Second, the current paper has not allowed the manufacturer

If the manufacturer decides to issue a regular coupon for the

to explicitly design the duration of the e-coupons. As we

lows, then he seeks to

mentioned in section 3.4, allowing n<∞ (imperfect
forwarding) would significantly change the manufacturer’s
optimal

coupon

strategy

and

his

relationship

with

Max Ð =ð[p-(1-a)ñ]-F
p, ρ

s.t. v+ñ-c-p≧0,

downstream channel members. Thus it will be promising to

V-p≧0,

explicitly examine how the design of duration may alter the

v+ñ-c-p≧v-p,

optimal face value of the e-coupon and the size of the

V-p≧V+ñ-A-C-p,

initially reached consumers. This will be even more
interesting, if the spreading-out of the e-coupon can be

The first two inequalities are the lows’ and the highs’

modeled as a stochastic process where the law of large

individual rationality constraints, and the last two their

numbers may not be needed.

incentive compatibility constraints. The optimal product
price and the face value of the regular coupon are

Third, the current paper has not allowed much heterogeneity

respectively p=v+A+C-c and ñ=A+C. Correspondingly, the
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